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IV. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-(2)(k) (1953, as amended). 
V. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Whether Appellee, who materially breached a contractual 
duty to direct and supervise the construction of Appellants' 
residence, is entitled to damages under the construction contract 
establishing such duty and setting the amount of compensation for 
discharging such duty. 
The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals 
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without 
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v. 
Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
B. Whether Appellee, who breached the contract and was 
justifiably discharged from the job, is entitled to maintain an 
action against the non-breaching Appellant under a theory of unjust 
enrichment to recover amounts he would have been entitled to under 
the contract had he not breached or had he been unjustifiably 
discharged. 
The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals 
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without 
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v. 
54797 
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Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
C. Whether prejudgment interest is recoverable on an 
unliquidated award under a theory of quantum meruit or unjust 
enrichment. 
The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals 
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without 
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v. 
Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
D. "Whether post-judgment interest runs from the date 
judgment was entered or from the date the trial court granted 
Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment. 
The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals 
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without 
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v. 
Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
E. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants their 
attorney fees incurred in bringing a successful motion to dismiss 
Appellee's cause of action to enforce the mechanic's lien and cause 
of action for failure to obtain a construction bond. 
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The issue raises a question of law and the Court of Appeals 
should review the trial court's decision for "correctness" without 
giving deference to the trial court's view of the law. Van Dyke v. 
Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991); Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1992); 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 (1992); 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992); 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992). 
The foregoing provisions are set forth in full in the 
Addendum hereto. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal taken from the Third Judicial District 
Court of Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson presiding. The procedural history of the case is as 
follows: 
1. On or about December 5, 1990, Appellee Bailey-Allen 
Construction Company, Inc.1 filed a Complaint seeking to recover 
payment for services he alleged to have rendered in contracting and 
constructing Appellants' residence in Park City, Utah. (R. 002). 
1
 For convenience, "Appellee" is used in this Brief to 
designate Bailey-Allen Construction Company, Inc. and Richard 
Allen, its president and the individual involved in this dispute. 
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The Complaint alleged causes of action for Breach of Contract, 
Mechanic's Lien, Unjust Enrichment, and No Construction Bond. (R. 
001-008). 
2. On or about May 20, 1991, Appellants filed a Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on Appellee's Second Cause of Action 
(Mechanic's Lien), Third Cause of Action (Unjust Enrichment), and 
Fourth Cause of Action (No Construction Bond). (R. 062-064). 
3. On August 26, 1991, after hearing oral argument on 
Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Second, 
Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the trial court entered a Minute 
Entry granting Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
all three causes of action. (R. 106). 
4. On September 12, 1991, Appellants' attorney filed an 
Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, itemizing the attorney fees 
involved in bringing Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R. 111-114) . At the same time, Appellants submitted to 
the trial court a draft Judgment proposing to dismiss the three 
causes of action on which the trial court granted summary judgment 
and to grant Appellants their attorney fees and costs incurred in 
bring the Motion. (R. 110; 125-26). 
5. On September 16, 1991, Appellee filed an Objection 
to Proposed Judgment in which Appellee objected to the amount of 
attorney fees requested by Appellants. (R. 116-17). 
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6. Appellants submitted a Response to [Appellee's] 
Objection to Proposed Judgment on September 18, 1991 (R. 122-23), 
contending that an award of fees and costs were proper under the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, and the Bond 
Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2, and that the amount requested was 
reasonable since most of counsel's time on the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was spent on those causes of action. (R.123). 
7. On September 24, 1991, the trial court granted 
summary judgment on Appellee's claims for Unjust Enrichment, 
Mechanic's Lien and Construction Bond, and ordered that the mechan-
ic's lien be discharged. (R. 127-28). The court reserved Appel-
lants' request for attorneys' fees and costs under the Mechanic's 
Lien statute for future determination. (R. 128). 
8. Appellee's remaining cause of action for breach of 
contract was tried to the bench on December 18 and 19, 1991 and on 
January 30, 1992. (R. 305). 
9. During the trial, the court stated that it had erred 
in dismissing the cause of action for unjust enrichment and it 
reinstated the cause of action sua sponte over Appellants' 
objection. (R. 543-45). 
10. At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued its 
ruling from the bench, awarding Appellee damages and directing 
Appellants to submit Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment. (R. 806). 
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11. On or about March 12, 1992, Appellee filed a Motion 
to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. (R. 171). 
Appellants' counsel advised the court that it had not yet received 
the transcript of trial and could not prepare the findings, 
conclusions and judgment without the transcripts. (R. 178) . 
12. Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment was granted on April 17, 1992. (R.182). 
13. Appellants filed a Notice of Substitution of Counsel 
on May 20, 1992, (R. 184A) , and submitted proposed findings, 
conclusions and judgment on or about May 27, 1992. (R. 187). 
14. Appellee filed Objections to the Proposed Findings, 
Conclusion and Judgment on July 6, 1992 (R. 204) , and a hearing was 
held on August 28, 1992, on Appellee's Objections. (R. 213). The 
court entered judgment on October 7, 1992. (R. 220). 
15. On October 19, 1992, Appellants filed a Motion to 
Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 266). 
16. On November 24, 1992, Appellee served a Writ of 
Execution on Appellant. (R. 272). 
17. On December 8, 1992, upon a joint motion of Appellee 
and Appellant, the court issued an order staying execution of the 
judgment, authorizing Appellant to pay the judgment into court, and 
determining that said payment was adequate security of Appellee 
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pending the determination of Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
the Judgment and pending the appeal of this matter. (R. 279). 
18. Appellants' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment 
was denied on January 14, 1993. (R. 288). 
19. Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on February 12, 
1993. (R. 294). 
VIII. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Except where noted, the following Statement of Relevant 
Facts is taken from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
adopted by the trial court. See Addendum A. Appellants do not 
dispute the Findings of Fact, but they do contend that the trial 
court erred in its Conclusions of Law. 
On or about July 3, 1990, Appellants and Appellee entered 
into a contract whereby Appellee agreed to act as the general 
contractor and to oversee the construction of Appellant's residence 
in Park City, Utah. (R. 214-15) . The contract provided, among 
other things, that Appellee would provide evidence of adequate 
insurance coverage for the construction project, that he would act 
as the general contractor, and that he would supervise and direct 
the construction. (R. 214-15). In return, Appellants agreed to 
pay all costs of labor and material including $22 per hour for 
Appellee's own hands-on labor, and pay Appellee $100,000 for 
directing and supervising the construction. Id. 
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At the time the contract was signed, Appellee represented to 
Appellant that he had $1,000,000 in liability insurance in force, 
(R. 215)• He failed, however, to provide evidence of such insur-
ance as required by the contract. Id. Appellee later discovered 
that his policy was for only $300,000 coverage and that it had been 
cancelled on October 24, 1989, nearly two years before the 
Appellant and Appellee entered into the contract. (R. 215-16). 
Appellants notified Appellee on July 20, 1990 that Appellee had not 
yet provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance 
coverage and that Appellants required such evidence under the terms 
of the contract. (R. 216). As of October 2, 1990, Appellee still 
had not provided a certificate of insurance. (R. 348-50, Testimony 
of Appellee, Richard Allen). 
At the time Appellee entered into the contract, he was aware 
that Appellants had experienced problems with prior general 
contractors and had terminated two general contractors for 
unsatisfactory performance. (R. 215). Appellee was also aware 
that Appellants were meticulous and demanding individuals and would 
require exacting performance of the contract. Id. 
On or about October 2, 1990, Appellants terminated Appellee 
from the construction project for Appellee's failure to obtain 
insurance as required by the contract, and his failure to ade-
quately direct and supervise the construction. (R. 216). Appellee 
filed a mechanic's lien, brought an action to foreclose the lien 
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and an action for failure to obtain a construction bond, and sought 
to recover damages under the contract and under a theory of unjust 
enrichment for the $100,000 fee for directing and supervising the 
construction. (R. 001-008, Complaint). 
On September 24, 1991, the trial court granted summary 
judgment on Appellee's claims for Unjust Enrichment, Mechanic's 
Lien and Construction Bond, and ordered that the mechanic's lien be 
discharged. (R. 127-28, Order of Partial Summary Judgment). 
The contract claim was tried to the bench on December 18 and 
19, 1991 and on January 30, 1992. (R. 305, Reporter's Transcript 
of Trial Proceedings ("Trial Transcript")). During the trial, the 
court, sua sponte. reinstated the cause of action for Unjust 
Enrichment over Appellants' objection. (R. 543-45, Trial 
Transcript). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued its ruling 
from the bench. (R. 797-806, Trial Transcript). Pursuant to the 
court's instructions, Appellants' submitted Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter "Proposed Findings and 
Conclusions" (R. 187-92), and a Proposed Judgment based on the 
court's verbal ruling. (R. 193-94). Appellee filed an Objection 
to Appellants' Proposed Findings and Conclusions (R. 204-07), and 
on August 28, 1992, a hearing was held on Appellee's Objections to 
the Proposed Findings and Conclusions (R. 213). 
54797 
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On October 7, 1992, the trial court adopted Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and entered Judgment. (R. 214-22) . The 
court determined that a written contract existed between Appellee 
and Appellants; that although the written contract was ambiguous 
and incomplete as drafted, it could be interpreted as written; and 
that the court would look on it as an oral contract, (R. 217). 
The trial court found that, under the contract, Appellee had 
a duty to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability 
insurance, but did not. (R. 217) . The court concluded that 
Appellee's failure to provide evidence of adequate insurance was a 
material breach of the contract and that Appellants were justified 
in terminating Appellee's services for that breach. Id. 
The trial court also found that Appellee failed to meet his 
obligation to oversee the construction. (R. 217). The trial court 
concluded that Appellants were justified in terminating Appellee 
from the job because Appellee did not give the construction project 
the kind of attention Appellee knew it would require under the 
contract. (R. 217). 
The trial court concluded that Appellants were not in breach 
of the contract in any way. (R. 218) . Nevertheless, the court 
awarded Appellee damages "in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, 
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based on the contract..."2 (R. 218). It found that about 10% of 
the construction project had been completed while Appellee was 
general contractor. (R. 216) . Based on that percentage, the court 
determined that Appellants had received a benefit from Appellee's 
pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000 "regardless of 
whether [Appellee] performed its duties under the contract." (R. 
216) . 
The trial court concluded that Appellee was entitled to 
receive $15,500 from defendant Appellants, "$10,000 representing 
1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for services in completing 
1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for services involving 
negotiations for the purchase of lumber." (R. 218). After 
calculating offsets for amounts owed by Appellee to Appellant for 
faulty construction of a retaining wall and staircase, and for 
unnecessary materials, the net judgment against Appellants, before 
interest, was $11,141.00. (R. 218-19). 
2
 For the purposes of this Brief "unjust enrichment" and 
"quantum meruit" are used interchangeably. Under Utah law, "quasi-
contract" or "unjust enrichment" is the branch of "quantum meruit" 
allowing a contract to be implied in law and permitting a legal 
action in restitution. Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 
App. 1987). Quantum meruit encompasses unjust enrichment. In the 
present case, there seems to be no reason for any distinction 
between the phrases. 
Also, for the sake of simplicity, the term "damages" is used 
in this Brief to mean the award of money to Appellee (exclusive of 
interest and offsets) regardless of whether such amount was awarded 
pursuant to the contract or under a theory of unjust enrichment. 
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Pre-judgment interest was awarded at the rate of ten percent 
(10%) per annum, from November 1, 1990, the date Appellants 
terminated Appellee's services, to April 17, 1992, the date the 
trial court granted Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment. (R. 219). 
The court assessed post-judgment interest at the rate of 
twelve percent (12%) per annum, from and after April 17, 1992, the 
date the trial court granted Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. (R. 219). Judgment was entered 
October 7, 1992. Id. 
On October 19, 1992, Appellants filed a Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 266) . Appellants moved the court to vacate 
the award of damages and interest, and to grant Appellants their 
attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing their successful 
motion for summary judgment on Appellee's cause of action to 
foreclose the mechanic's lien. .Id. The Motion to Alter or Amend 
the Judgment was denied on January 13, 1993. (R. 288). 
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IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellee was not entitled to damages under the contract 
because he failed to perform under the contract. Under Utah law, 
in order to recover on a contract, "a contractor must first 
establish his own performance." Nielsen v. Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 
(Utah 1980). In the present case, the trial court specifically 
found that Appellee did not perform under the provision of contract 
requiring him to direct and supervise the construction. (R. 217) . 
Because Appellee failed to perform the duties on which payment was 
contingent, the court's ruling was error insofar as it was based on 
the contract. 
Similarly, the court erred in awarding Appellee any recovery 
on its claim for unjust enrichment. Under Utah law, with only very 
few exceptions that are not applicable here, an award for unjust 
enrichment is prohibited when an enforceable contract exists. 
Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah App. 
1992); Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 1987). 
Moreover, it was inappropriate for the court to conclude that 
Appellee conferred any benefit on Appellants. While 10% of the 
construction may have been completed during the period of time that 
Appellee was general contractor, Appellee did not cause that 
construction to be completed. In fact, the court found that 
Appellee failed to perform his duty in supervising the construc-
tion. Because Utah law forbids recovery in quantum meruit when a 
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valid contract exists, and in view of the court's ruling that 
Appellee failed to properly perform his duties as general contrac-
tor, it was error to award Appellee anything under a theory of 
unjust enrichment. 
Assuming, arguendo, that an award of damages was proper, the 
trial court erred in awarding Appellee prejudgment interest. 
Prejudgment interest is warranted only when the amount of damages 
is certain from the time of loss. Shoreline Development, Inc. v. 
Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. May 19, 1992) . In equity 
cases, prejudgment interest is generally not available because the 
amount of damages cannot be calculated with any certainty. Id. 
(citing Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991)) . In the 
present case, the amount the court awarded was unliquidated at the 
time of loss. (R. 128) . It was error, therefore, to award 
prejudgment interest. 
Assuming, arguendo, that an award of damages was 
appropriate, the trial court also erred in awarding Appellee post-
judgment interest from the date that it granted Appellee's Motion 
to Compel Filing of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Utah 
law clearly holds that post-judgment interest runs from the date 
judgment is entered. Utah R. of Civ. P. 54(e) (1992); Utah R. App. 
P. 32 (1993) . 
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to award 
Appellants their attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing their 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Appellee's causes of action 
based on the Mechanic's Lien Statute and on the Construction Bond 
Statute. The provision at Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 mandates that 
the successful party be awarded its reasonable attorney fees in an 
action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The court has discretion to 
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action 
for failure to obtain a construction bond. Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-
2(3). In the present case, Appellants' timely and properly 
requested such fees and costs. The trial court failed to determine 
the proper amount of fees and failed to award fees to Appellants 
for prevailing on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with 
respect to the Second and Fourth Causes of Action. 
Appellants, therefore, petition this Court to vacate the 
award of damages to Appellee, vacate the award of prejudgment and 
post-judgment interest, and to remand the case to the trial court 
with instructions to award Appellants their attorney fees and costs 





A. THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE AWARD OF DAM-
AGES TO APPELLEE. 
The trial court misapplied the law when it awarded 
Appellee damages and interest. A valid, enforceable contract 
existed, and because Appellee breached the contract, it was 
improper to award Appellee damages under the contract. The 
relationship of the parties was governed by the contract, and it 
was, therefore, improper to grant relief under a theory of unjust 
enrichment. There was simply no legal basis for the trial court's 
decision in this case. 
1. The Trial Court's Award of Damages to Appellee Was 
Improperly Based on Both the Contract and on a 
Theory of Unjust Enrichment. 
The trial court's error in awarding damages stemmed from 
its finding that Appellee was in material breach of the contract 
while, at the same time, allowing Appellee to recover the amount 
that he would have been entitled to under the contract had he not 
breached. Because the court found that Appellee breached the 
contract and Appellant did not, it was left without a basis for an 
award of damages on the contract. The trial court, thus, awarded 
money to Appellee "based on the contract" and on a cause of action 
for unjust enrichment that the court had dismissed and then 
reinstated on its own initiative. (R. 218; 543-44) . The resulting 
decision was a cryptic blend of legal theories. 
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Ruling from the bench, the court unequivocally found that 
Appellee had breached the contract. It stated: 
[Appellant's] testimony was that the contract 
was terminated because of the insurance. I 
think it is a major factor and I think he had 
the right to terminate the contract on that. 
And I think there were differences that 
began to arise as far as the attitude of being 
on the job, taking care of things right now, 
getting things done, seeing that they were 
done, seeing things were moving along, answer-
ing the questions, which the plaintiffs were 
not performing as far as the contract was 
concerned. 
Therefore the court does find that the 
plaintiff did breach the contract and that the 
defendant was justified in terminating the 
relationship, terminating the contract. 
(R. 801). Having thus found, the court vaguely stated its reason 
for awarding damages: 
Now the question comes up as to unjust 
enrichment. . . . The court accepts the 
testimony of the architect and believes that 
. . . that is the best, most reliable testimo-
ny as far as the contract is concerned. 
And of course his testimony was that 
approximately 25% of the job was completed, 
15% of it was completed at the time . . . when 
the plaintiff's commenced working and of 
course he said "less than 10%." Counsel did 
not tie him down to a figure; therefore, this 
court is going to accept the figure of 10% and 
find that . . . the plaintiffs are entitled to 
10% of the amount of the contract. 
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(R. 801-03) . This language suggests that the court awarded 
Appellee a recovery in unjust enrichment. 
The trial court ordered that Appellant's prepare the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and submit them to Appellee 
for approval. (R. 806). The trial court's imprecise ruling, 
however, created a problem as to whether the court had awarded 
Appellee damages under the contract or whether it had granted 
relief for unjust enrichment. Appellants' proposed Findings and 
Conclusions stated that the trial court had based the award on a 
theory of unjust enrichment. (R. 191). Appellee objected to the 
proposed finding limiting recovery to a quantum meruit theory of 
law. (R. 204) . The parties presented oral argument on the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the trial 
court, again ruling from the bench, stated as follows: 
. . . the unjust enrichment, there is no 
question that this was a case based on the 
contract, that there was unjust enrichment, 
but it was a contract, which they entered 
into, which was not a complete contract, which 
this Court based an award on. So this is not 
only an unjust enrichment theory, it was also 
based on a contract which the parties had 
entered into. 
(R. 213, Reporter's Partial Transcript of Hearing on Objections to 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment: 
Court's Ruling, at pp. 2-3). 
In an attempt to articulate the trial court's ruling in 
writing, Appellee and Appellants' counsel finally agreed on the 
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following language which was incorporated into the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law: 
8. The Court finds, that about 10% of the 
construction was completed while plaintiff was 
general contractor and, based on that percent-
age, defendants received a benefit from plain-
tiff's pre-termination services in the amount 
of $10,000 regardless of whether plaintiff 
performed its duties under the contract. 
(R. 217, Findings of Fact)(emphasis added). 
4. The court concludes that plaintiff's 
failure to promptly provide evidence of ad-
equate liability insurance was a material 
breach of the contract. 
6. The Court concludes that defendants were 
justified in terminating plaintiff's services 
because plaintiff spent very few hours on the 
job site and did not give the construction 
project the attention that it required under 
the contract and that plaintiff knew Mr. 
Kurzet would expect. 
• . . . 
8. With respect to Appellees' Unjust En-
richment Claim, the Court has considered 
several alternative methods of calculating any 
award to Appellee under such a theory. The 
Court concludes the most logical basis to be 
the percentage of Appellants' residence that 
was completed during the period Appellee was 
on the job. 
10. The Court concludes that Appellee is 
entitled to receive $15,500 from defendant in 
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the 
contract between Appellee and Appellants, 
$10,000 representing l/10th of the contract 
price of $100,000 for services in completing 
l/10th of the construction and $5,500 for 
services involving negotiations for the pur-
chase of lumber. 
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(R. 214, 218). Based on the foregoing, the trial court awarded 
$15,500 in damages to Appellee less offsets for repairs to the 
retaining wall and stairs and for unnecessary materials. (R. 
218-19). 
The parties had an enforceable contract and Appellee, not 
Appellants, materially breached the contract. Having breached the 
contract, Appellee was not entitled to damages based on the 
contract. And, because a valid contract existed, Appellee was not 
entitled to an award in quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. By 
relying on both the contract and on a theory of unjust enrichment, 
the trial court sowed seeds of confusion and error and, ultimately, 
reached the wrong result. As demonstrated below, there were no 
grounds, either under the contract or in quantum meruit, for an 
award to Appellee. 
2. Appellee is Not Entitled to Damages On the Con-
tract. 
The trial court correctly found that Appellee breached 
the contract in two respects. First, Appellee failed to provide 
evidence of adequate insurance. The contract provided for it (R. 
10) , Appellant said he had $1 million in coverage when, in fact, he 
did not (R. 215-16). Even after Appellants notified Appellee of 
the deficiency, Appellee failed to obtain coverage and provide 
evidence thereof. (R. 800-01). 
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In addition to failing to provide adequate evidence of 
insurance, the trial court found that Appellee failed to spend 
adequate time on the project and failed to give the project the 
attention required to properly direct and supervise the construc-
tion. (R. 217) . That finding was well supported by the record. 
Appellee was rarely on the construction site. Appellants' payment 
records showed that the time Appellee spent on hands-on labor over 
a period of more than two months, from July 9, 1990 through 
September 15, 1990, amounted to only 60.5 hours. (R. 81, 84). 
The construction that Appellee did supervise was often 
substandard. Under his supervision, a retaining wall was built out 
of square with the house (R. 436) , a flight of concrete stairs was 
improperly placed (R. 713-14), and unnecessary materials were 
ordered. (R. 219; 721) . The cost of correcting those mistakes was 
found to be $1,800 for the wall, $2,000 for the stairs and $559 for 
the unnecessary materials. (R. 805; 218-19). 
Appellee knew that Appellants would be very demanding and 
meticulous about the construction, and that they would require 
exacting performance of the contract. (R. 215). Yet, the court 
found that Appellee was "very flippant in his attitude as far as 
the job was concerned," and that his flippant attitude "was 
conveyed to the defendant throughout the course of this contract." 
(R. 799). Differences between Appellee and Appellants arose 
concerning Appellee's "attitude of being on the job," Appellee's 
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attention to "getting things done, . . . seeing things were moving 
along," and his availability to answer questions about the project. 
(R. 801). The trial court observed that, given the size of the 
project and the amount of compensation Appellee was to receive 
under the contract, the project deserved closer attention than the 
Appellee gave it. (R. 798) . The court concluded that Appellee was 
"not performing as far as the contract was concerned." (R. 801). 
"The rule in Utah is that to recover on a contract, a 
contractor must first establish his own performance [or] a valid 
excuse for his failure to perform." Nielsen v. Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 
514 (Utah 1980). A breaching party cannot enforce a contract 
against a non-breaching party. Id. ; see also. Liddle v. Petty. 816 
P.2d 1066, 1068 (Mont. 1991) (if one contracting party materially 
breaches the contract the other is entitled to suspend his 
performance); Parsons Supply. Inc. v. Smith. 591 P.2d 821, 823 
(Wash App. 1978) (a breaching party cannot demand performance from 
nonbreaching party). 
Having breached the provision of the contract on which 
the $100,000 payment was contingent, Appellee was not entitled to 
enforce it against Appellants. For the same reason, contrary to 
the trial court's decision, Appellee was not entitled to recover 
under the contract $5,500 for "negotiating the purchase of lumber." 
(R. 218). Appellee testified at trial that shortly after he had 
begun his work as the contractor on the construction project, he 
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took an inventory of lumber that had been ordered by a previous 
contractor but had not yet been paid for by Appellants. (R. 748) . 
Appellants had planned to pay $28,000 for the lumber. Id. 
Appellee testified that he recommended to Appellants that they pay 
only $22,500 for the lumber instead of $28,000, and that Appellants 
were ultimately successful in purchasing the lumber for the lower 
price, a savings of $5,500. (R. 748-49). 
Under the contract, Appellee was required to "obtain 
competitive bids for services and materials." (R.010). Assuming 
there was any savings as a result of Appellee's negotiation,3 
Appellee was not entitled to compensation for having advised 
Appellants and saved them money on the purchase of lumber. That 
was merely one of the services Appellee was required to render 
under the contract. The fact that he may have performed some tasks 
in fulfillment of his supervisory duty does not excuse a material 
breach of that duty. Certainly, it does not entitle Appellee to 
receive in damages the amount that he saved Appellants in expenses 
when it was part of his job to purchase materials at an economic 
price. 
The trial court erred in granting Appellee relief under 
the contract because, as the court determined, Appellee did not 
3
 The record contains no proof that such savings were 
realized. For the purposes of this Brief, however, Appellants 
assume that the savings occurred because the trial court so 
determined. (R. 216). 
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perform under the contract.4 This Court, therefore, should vacate 
the award of damages insofar as it is based on the contract. 
3 • Appellee Is Not Entitled to Any Recovery On Its 
Claim for Unjust Enrichment. 
Under Utah law, an award for unjust enrichment is inap-
propriate when an enforceable contract exists. See, Karapanos v. 
Boardwalk Fries. Inc. . 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah App. 1992) (Appellee 
not entitled to recover franchising fee under theory of unjust 
enrichment when enforceable franchising agreement exists). The 
Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "[r]ecovery under quantum 
meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract 
exists." Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 1987). 
The rationale for resorting to a quantum meruit theory is that 
there is no contract yet there is some benefit that has been 
4
 Assuming for the sake of argument that somehow plaintiff 
could have been entitled to enforce the contract despite the 
breach, the trial court still would have erred in awarding damages 
because Appellee didn't prove his damages. Under Utah law, if a 
plaintiff cannot prove the fact of damages with reasonable 
certainty, he is not entitled to any. Sawyers v. F.M.A. Leasing 
Co. , 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 
1985) (standard of proof required for establishing the fact of 
damages is greater than that required for establishing the amount). 
The damages recoverable by a contractor under a construction 
contract are "the total amount promised for the project, less the 
reasonable costs of completing it." Holman v. Sorenson. 556 P.2d 
499, 500 (Utah 1976). Appellants expended considerable sums to 
finish the job and to correct Appellee's unacceptable work after 
Appellee was terminated from his employment. Appellee failed to 
put on any evidence of the reasonable costs of completing the 
project and to prove the fact of damages with any reasonable degree 
of certainty. 
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conferred. Id. at 268. In the absence of an express contract, the 
theory allows a contract to be implied either in law or in fact. 
Id. 
There are very few exceptions to the rule. When an 
express construction contract exists, Utah courts have suggested 
that recovery in quantum meruit is proper only under extraordinary 
circumstances. When the work performed is very different from the 
work described in the construction contract, it may become 
reasonable to imply a contract that covers the additional work. 
Under such circumstances, an award of recovery in quantum meruit 
may be appropriate. But see. Highland Construction Co. v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (Court denied 
recovery in quantum meruit because Appellee contractor failed to 
prove in what respects the work performed differed from the work 
contemplated by the contract). In the present case, Appellee has 
not claimed, nor does the evidence show that any of the work 
Appellee performed fell outside the scope of contract. 
Quantum meruit may also be applicable when a contractor 
justifiably ceases work or is unjustifiably terminated. See. 
Davies, 683 P.2d at 1048 (dicta). In the present case, the trial 
court expressly determined that Appellant was justified in termi-
nating Appellee. The instant case does not present a set of facts 
that would allow recovery in quantum meruit in the face of a valid 
contract. 
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Assuming for the sake of argument that, contrary to the 
trial court's ruling, no enforceable contract existed, it still 
would have been error to award Appellee anything in unjust 
enrichment. To recover in an action for unjust enrichment, 
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that defendant received a benefit; 
(2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; 
(3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant 
to retain the benefit without paying for it." Davies v. Olsen, 746 
P.2d at 269. The measure of recovery is "the value of the benefit 
conferred." .Id. The purpose of quantum meruit is "to prevent the 
defendant's enrichment at the plaintiff's expense." Id. (citations 
omitted) . Of course, the theory presupposes that it was the 
plaintiff who conferred the benefit on the defendant. 
In the present case, the trial court's rationale for 
awarding damages was that, because ten percent of the construction 
project was completed while Appellee was the general contractor, 
Appellants received a benefit from Appellee's pre-termination 
services "regardless of whether Appellee performed its duties under 
the contract." (R. 216). The ruling is self-contradictory. If 
Appellee didn't perform, then Appellee conferred no benefit. 
The court relied on the testimony of an architectural 
draftsman to determine that 10% of the work was completed between 
early July and the end of September, the time period that Appellee 
was supposed to be acting as general contractor. (R. 803). In 
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focusing on the percentage that was completed, the court ignored 
the fact that Appellee was not responsible for completing it. The 
court stated: 
Now a lot is said that they [Appellee] 
should not be entitled even to that amount, 
because of their not being on the job and not 
answering the questions. 
And that might be, except for the fact 
that even if they were not there, and were not 
able to answer questions, the architect did 
testify that there had been 10% work accom-
plished, and therefore the defendant had been 
enriched by that amount. 
(R. 803) (emphasis added) . The court concluded that even if 
Appellee could not be credited with causing 10% of the construction 
to be completed, the very fact that it was completed entitled 
Appellee to 10% of the amount provided for in the contract. 
Appellants may have been enriched, but it was not unjustly. The 
record demonstrates that it was not Appellee who enriched them. 
Appellee had a contractual duty to select bids for 
services and materials. (R. 010). Mr. Kurzet testified that, 
before Appellee was hired as the general contractor, Appellants had 
already selected a carpenter and contractor, Andrew Parker, to 
frame the house. (R. 599) . Appellee was given the "option" to 
hire Mr. Parker as the framer, but if Appellee had not selected 
Parker, Appellants would not have hired Appellee. (R. 599-600) . 
In other words, Appellee had to accept Appellants' choice of 
framers. Similarly, Appellee had no discretion in hiring the mason 
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who was selected solely by Appellants. (R. 601). After Appellee 
was terminated from the job, Mr. Parker continued to work on the 
project as the general contractor and was still employed by 
Appellants at the time this matter was tried. (R. 598-601). 
The testimony at trial suggested that Appellee was only 
minimally instrumental, not only in selecting the subcontractors, 
but in supervising the project. Architectural draftsman, Stanley 
Johnson, testified that he was involved in the design, drafting and 
construction of Appellants' residence and, as part of his responsi-
bilities in that regard, made periodic inspections of the structure 
and met with the workmen. (R. 666, 671) . Mr. Johnson met with Mr. 
Parker and the mason on a regular basis, at least once or twice a 
week from July through September. (R. 676) . During the same 
period of time, he met with Appellee between four and ten times. 
Id. Moreover, Mr. Johnson testified that the progress that 
occurred on the structure during that time period consisted of 
building the stone chimneys and framing the first three floors, 
accomplishments of the framer and mason. (R. 677). 
Mr. Kurzet testified that Mr. Parker was responsible for 
working out design changes with the architect and for avoiding 
delays in the construction due to such changes. (R. 513) . 
Although Mr. Parker tried to keep Appellee apprised of the process, 
Appellee was not present on a day-to-day basis and it was Mr. 
Parker who "grabbed the ball and ran with it." Id. Mr. Parker 
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testified that almost every afternoon after work he went to the 
architect's office to discuss problems that had arisen with the 
construction. (R. 700) . Appellee was not present at any of those 
meetings between Mr. Parker and the architect (R. 700-01), and Mr. 
Parker estimated that Appellee was seldom at the job site for more 
than about one half hour each day. (R. 695) . In fact# Mr. Parker 
testified that had Appellee never been present at all, the framing 
would have been accomplished and the rate of construction would not 
have slowed. (R. 710) . 
The record in this case shows that Appellee did little to 
contribute toward the progress in the construction of Appellants' 
residence that took place between July and September of 1990. 
Appellee was fairly paid for the work that he did; every invoice 
that Appellee submitted to Appellants was paid, including those for 
Appellee's own labor. (R. 93, Affidavit of Richard Allen; R. 81-
85, Exhibit to Affidavit of Stanley M. Kurzet (showing itemization 
of labor costs paid)). If ten percent of the construction was 
completed during that period, it was not due to Appellee's 
services, but to the efforts of others. Even the trial court seems 
to have recognized that Appellants were not unjustly enriched by 
Appellee when it ruled that Appellee did not give the project the 
attention it deserved. 
The award of unjust enrichment should be vacated because 
such an award is not allowed under Utah law when there is a valid 
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contract, and because Appellee's services were not of significant 
benefit to Appellants. 
B. THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE AWARD TO 
APPELLEE OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial 
court concluded that Appellee was entitled to prejudgment interest 
at the rate of 10% per annum from the date Appellants terminated 
Appellee's services to April 17, 1992, the date the trial court 
granted Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions 
and Judgment. The award of prejudgment interest is error and 
should be vacated. 
An award of prejudgment interest on an unjust enrichment 
award is contrary to law. Under Utah law, an award of prejudgment 
interest is warranted only when the amount of damages is certain 
from the time of loss. Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 
835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. May 19, 1992) . The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that where damages cannot be calculated with mathemati-
cal accuracy, prejudgment interest is not recoverable. Biork v. 
April Indus. . Inc. . 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) , cert, denied 431 
U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245. In order for damages to 
mathematically certain, they must be ascertained 
in accordance with the fixed rules of evidence 
and known standards of value, which the court 
or jury must follow in fixing the amount, 
rather than be guided by their best judgment 
in assessing the amount to be allowed for past 
as well as for future injury, or for elements 
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that cannot be measured by any fixed standard 
of value. 
Price-Orem v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnel 1, 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah 
App. 1989) (quoting Fell v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 32 Utah 
101, 88 P. 1003, 1005 (1907)). 
In equity cases, damages often cannot be calculated with 
mathematical certainty, thus prejudgment interest on an award in 
equity is generally not allowed under Utah law. In Shoreline 
Development, the plaintiff appealed a denial of prejudgment 
interest on an unjust enrichment award. The plaintiff contended 
that because an unjust enrichment claim is similar to a contract 
claim, prejudgment interest should have been awarded. The Court of 
Appeals observed that the determining factor in awarding prejudg-
ment interest is not the nature of the claim; it is "whether the 
damages upon which prejudgment interest is sought can be calculated 
with mathematical certainty." Id. at 211.5 The Court noted that, 
5
 There are numerous cases in support of this proposition. 
E.g. Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State. 552 P.2d 107, 108-09 
(Utah 1976) (amount due under the contract was ascertainable by 
calculation); Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1225 
(Utah Adv. 1990) ("A court can award pre-judgment interest only 
when the loss is fixed at a particular time and the amount can be 
fixed with accuracy."); Biork v. April Indus., Inc.. 560 P.2d 315, 
317 (Utah) cert, denied. 431 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct. 2634 (1977) (where 
damages cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy the amount 
of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact 
and pre-judgment interest is not allowed); Fell v. Union Pacific 
Ry. Co.. 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1006 (1907) ("in all . . . cases 
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the 
province of the jury to assess at the time of trial, no interest is 
permissible.") . 
54797 -31-
because an award in equity is based on the amount by which one is 
unjustly enriched, it is less likely to admit of mathematical 
certainty. Prejudgment interest, therefore, is generally precluded 
in equity claims. Jd. (citing Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 
1097 (Utah 1991)). 
Even though prejudgment interest is generally not 
recoverable in an equity claim, a plaintiff is not denied an 
remedy. A plaintiff may claim lost interest as part of damages. 
Shoreline Development, at 29 (citing Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White 
Superior Co. . 546 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1976) . The Court clearly 
articulated the rule: " [P]rejudgment interest must be sought 
directly as damages in unjust enrichment cases, if at all." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In the present case, the trial court stated that it based 
the amount on the contract. But the underlying rationale for the 
award of damages was the unsupported conclusion that Appellants 
received a benefit from Appellee's services. The trial court found 
that "approximately" ten percent of the work had been completed 
based on the architect's testimony of "less than ten percent," 
although the court noted that "counsel did not tie him down to a 
figure." (R. 803). 
There was no argument nor even any suggestion by either 
party that the amount of the award was ascertainable from the time 
of the alleged loss. In fact, the trial court had already ruled 
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that the amount was not ascertainable. (R. 299, Reporter's 
Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Scheduling Conference at pp. 12-15) . Part of the basis for the 
court's granting Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the Mechanic's Lien cause of action was that the sum that Appellee 
claimed was owed him for supervisory services was unliquidated. 
Id. The court found that Appellee "had no right to file a 
mechanic's lien against [Appellants'] property for an unliquidated 
sum." (R. 128, Order of Partial Summary Judgment). 
As discussed above, the amount of damages in this case 
was determined by approximating the value of the construction that 
was completed while Appellee was the general contractor. The 
amount of unjust enrichment could not have been calculated with 
mathematical certainty, either at the time of loss or at the moment 
of judgment because it depended on the trial court's sense of 
equity in compensating for a benefit supposedly conferred. 
Prejudgment interest is contrary to law and the award should be 
vacated. 
C. THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE AWARD OF POST-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
The Court should amend the judgment to vacate the award 
of post-judgment interest because, as discussed above, Appellee is 
not entitled to recovery either under the contract or, under a 
theory of unjust enrichment. Assuming, arguendo, that an award of 
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post-judgment interest had been appropriate, post-judgment interest 
should run from the date judgment was entered. Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(e); see also, Utah R. App. P. 32 (1993) ("Unless otherwise 
provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from 
the date the judgment was entered in the trial court") (emphasis 
added) . 
The trial court awarded post-judgment interest on $11,141 
at the rate of 12% per annum from and after April 17, 1992. (R. 
219). The court reasoned that because Appellee prevailed on its 
Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, 
Appellee should recover post-judgment interest from the date the 
trial court granted the Motion. Presumably, the trial court meant 
to penalize Appellants for delaying the date that judgment was 
finally entered.6 
Rule 54(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that interest on a judgment runs "from the time it was rendered." 
Although the rule does not state that a judgment is rendered upon 
6
 During the same period of time, however, Appellants were 
involved in retaining new counsel and delay was inevitable. (R. 
184A, Notice of Substitution of Counsel, May 20, 1992). Appel-
lants' new counsel promptly filed the pleading. Appellee has not 
sought sanctions for delay or alleged any impropriety in that 
respect and it would have been inappropriate for the trial court to 
penalize Appellants by awarding post-judgment interest from the 
date the Motion to Compel was granted. 
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the date that it is "entered", such an interpretation is compelled 
under the law of Utah and other jurisdictions. 
Most jurisdictions hold that interest on a judgment 
accrues from the date the judgment is entered. The rationale is 
that the date of entry is the date damages become liquidated. The 
Washington Court of Appeals has articulated the majority view. In 
National Steel Construction Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance 
Co. of Pittsburgh, 543 P.2d 642 (Wash. App. 1975) , Appellee was 
awarded damages against an insurance company for its failure to 
accept a tender of defense in a product's liability case. The 
court awarded interest from the date of its oral decision fixing 
the amount of damages, rather than the date judgment was entered. 
The Washington Court of Appeals found it was error to impose 
interest "from the date of the court's oral decision rather than 
from the date the judgment was entered. Id. at 644. The court 
stated: "While it may be argued that those fees and costs became 
liquidated when the court announced its ruling, a trial judge's 
oral ruling is always subject to change prior to entry of a final 
judgment. Accordingly, it is the entry of judgment and not the 
oral decision that accomplishes a liquidation of the damages for 
attorney's fees." Id. at 644-45 (citations omitted).7 Before 
See also Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp. 754 P.2d 
984 (Utah App. 1985) (post-judgment interest runs from date of entry 
of new judgment, not from date of previous erroneous judgment) ; 
(continued...) 
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judgment is entered, a decision is subject to modification, the 
amount of damages is not certain, and interest on damages, 
therefore, is inappropriate. Id. 
As discussed above, there was substantial controversy 
over the measure of damages that should be applied in this case. 
The trial court specifically found that the sums owed to Appellee 
were unliquidated when Appellee filed the mechanic's lien (R. 127, 
Order of Partial Summary Judgment), and they remained unliquidated 
until the court entered judgment. 
Because Utah law fixes the date of entry of judgment as 
the date on which post-judgment interest begins to run, the trial 
court's award of post-judgment interest from the date it granted 
Appellee's Motion to Compel should be vacated. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD 
ATTORNEY PEES AND COSTS IN CONNECTION 
WITH APPELLANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON APPELLEE'S MECHANIC'S LIEN 
AND CONSTRUCTION BOND CLAIMS. 
The trial court's Judgment should be amended to include 
an award of attorney fees and costs to Appellants for having 
prevailed on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants 
on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action. (R. 127-28) . On 
7(...continued) 
Pure Gas and Chemical Co. v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 993 (Wyo. 1974) 
(Error to grant post-judgment interest from the date of the 
verdict, rather than the date judgment was entered). 
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September 12, 1991, Appellants' counsel filed an Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs in which he represented that the 
reasonable value of his service in bringing the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was $2,137.50. (R. 111-12). Appellants' counsel 
contended that it should be awarded attorney fees under both the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, and under the 
Construction Bond Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3). (R. 62; 
112; 123) . Appellee objected to the amount of attorney fees as 
being unreasonable, but did not contend that attorney fees should 
not be awarded. (R. 117) . In its Order of Partial Summary 
Judgment, the court reserved the issue of Appellants' request for 
attorney fees and costs for future determination. (R. 128). 
In their Proposed Judgment, without specifying the 
amount, Appellants proposed that a reasonable attorney fee be 
awarded. (R. 194). Appellants again requested attorney fees and 
costs at the Hearing on Proposed Findings and Judgment which took 
place on August 28, 1992. (R. 300, Reporter's Transcript of 
Hearing on Defendant's Proposed Findings and Judgment, at p. 20). 
Appellee objected to awarding Appellants the amount of 
$2,137.50, pointing out that "the court has never determined the 
amount of such fees, which amount needs to be determined by the 
Court." (R. 205) The trial court never did determine the 
appropriate amount. Ultimately, it denied attorney fees and costs 
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attributable to Appellants' successful Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R. 221). 
The section of the Mechanics' Lien Statute addressing 
attorney fees provides as follows: 
In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney 
fee# to be fixed by the Court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992) (emphasis added). While a court 
may have considerable discretion in determining the amount of 
fees,8 neither the statute nor the case law suggest that a court 
has discretion to deny attorney fees altogether. 
There are two requirements for recovering fees under the 
statute. First, the action must be one to "enforce" a mechanic's 
lien. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18; Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 716 
(Utah App. 1988) . Utah courts have held that an action seeking a 
determination of priority and an order of foreclosure and sale 
under the lien is an "action to enforce" the lien for purposes of 
the statute. Nu-Trend Electric. Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah App. 1990). In 
8
 See, e.g.. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988) (setting out general principles and practical guide-
lines by which a court may determine the appropriate amount of 
attorneys' fees in mechanic's lien cases). 
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the present case, Appellee sought exactly that: a determination of 
priority and an order of foreclosure under the mechanic's lien. 
The only other requirement for entitlement to attorney 
fees under the statute is that the party seeking the fees must be 
"the successful party." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. A party that 
successfully defends against enforcement of the lien is "the suc-
cessful party" and entitled to attorney fees. Palombi v. D&C 
Builders. 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (Utah 1969). In the present case, 
Appellants successfully defended against enforcement of the lien. 
As the successful party in an action to enforce the mechanic's 
lien, Appellants were entitled to recover a reasonable attorney fee 
as a matter of law. 
Under the Construction Bond Statute, fees and costs may 
be awarded to the prevailing party at the discretion of the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3). Counsel stated in his Response to 
[Appellee's] Objection to Proposed [Summary] Judgment, that the 
"majority of [his] time was spent on the mechanic's lien arguments 
(which includes the Bond law argument as the two are practically 
identical)." (R. 123). As discussed above, the trial court failed 
to determine and award reasonable fees and costs to Appellants for 
prevailing on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
mechanic's lien claim. The matter should be remanded for that 
determination. At the same time, the trial court should determine 
54797 
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whether an award of fees for the "Bond law" argument are appropri-
ate. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
There was no legal basis for the award of damages in this 
case. The trial court fashioned a hybrid remedy based on contract 
and in quantum meruit and, in doing so, it erred with respect to 
both theories of law. In basing the award on the contract, it 
allowed the breaching party to recover from the nonbreaching party. 
Basing it on a theory of unjust enrichment, it allowed recovery in 
the face of a valid contract and without proof that Appellants had 
been enriched by Appellee's efforts. Under either theory, the 
result is reversible error. 
The trial court also erred in awarding prejudgment 
interest on an unliquidated amount, and post-judgment interest from 
a point in time nearly six months before judgment was entered. The 
law with respect to prejudgment and post-judgment interest is 
straightforward and Appellants had briefed it in connection with 
their Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. The trial court 
apparently ignored the law to reach a result it desired. The same 
is true with respect to Appellants' application for attorney fees. 
The trial court ignored Appellants' numerous requests for fees that 
were mandated by statute and for fees that were discretionary with 
the court. Finally, acting contrary to law, it denied the 
54797 -40-
mandatory fees, and failed to rule on whether a discretionary award 
of fees was appropriate. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should vacate the 
award of damages to Appellee; vacate the award of prejudgment and 
post-judgment interest to Appellee; and remand the case to the 
trial court and instruct it to award Appellants their reasonable 
attorney fees and costs for prevailing on their Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Appellee's Third and Fourth Causes of Action. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SS, 
WILLIAM J. EVANS, being duly sworn says that he is 
employed in the law offices of PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER, attorneys 
for Appellants, that he has this day served four copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT and a copy of this Affidavit of 
Service by United States Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, 
to each of the following at the respective addresses shown below: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Allen Hardy & Rasmussen 
215 S. State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated at Salt Lake Ci 
1993. 
tah th>6N,^^ day of June, 
Subscribed and sworn to £e£0xe me this 
day of June, 1993 
I, OJL AH/PUBLIC 
JOYCE J. POLLARD 
201 South Main #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
Marctt 8,1997 
STATE OF UTAH 
sCX^ 
NOTOkRY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g a t : 
t£J<L4-^ 
^lAktPMnttj 
My Commission Expires: 
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XI. ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Judgment 
Construction Contract 
Determinative Rules and Statutes 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (1992) 
2. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 (1992) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992) 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992) 
ADDENDUM A 
ADDENDUM A 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, ) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an ) 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET ) 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees ) 
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; ) 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and ) Civil No. 10870 
John Does 1 through 10, ) 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
This action, having been tried to the Court, and the 
Court, having considered the evidence and the arguments of coun-
sel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby makes the follow-
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties intended to and 
did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act 
i< 1 L E D 
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Clerk of Summit County 




as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of 
defendants1 residence in Park City, Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the contract between the par-
ties provided that plaintiff would complete construction on 
defendants1 residence within one year and, in return, defendant 
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintiff's ser-
vices in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00 
per hour for plaintiff's own hands-on labor. 
3. The Court finds that plaintiff was aware that 
defendants had experienced problems with prior general contrac-
tors and had terminated two general contractors for unsatisfac-
tory performance. Plaintiff was also aware that Mr. Kurzet was a 
meticulous and demanding individual and would require exacting 
performance of the contract. 
4. The Court finds the parties intended and the con-
tract provided for plaintiff, within 10 days after entering into 
the contract, to provide defendants with evidence of adequate 
liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the contract. 
5. The Court finds that plaintiff represented to 
defendants that plaintiff had $1 million in liability insurance 
coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the con-
tract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted $4-5 million in 
coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered its policy was only 
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for $300,000 coverage and that it had been cancelled on October 
24, 1989. 
6. The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20, 
1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Michael 
Kent, defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet 
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage 
and that defendants required such evidence under the terms of the 
contract. 
7. The court find that defendants terminated plain-
tiffs services on October 2, 1990. 
8. The Court finds, that about 10% of the construc-
tion project was completed while plaintiff was general contractor 
and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from 
plaintiff's pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000 
regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties under the 
contract. 
9. The Court finds that defendants realized a benefit 
of $5,500 which represents the amount saved by defendants through 




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the subject contract was 
ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that the Court has a 
responsibility to add to it and to look upon it as an oral con-
tract between the parties. 
2. The Court concludes that the contract can be 
interpreted as written. 
3. The Court concludes that given the amount of the 
subject contract and the cost of the construction, plaintiff had 
a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for 
the project, but did not. 
4. The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to 
promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a 
material breach of the contract. 
5. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services for plaintiff's breach of its 
obligation to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability 
insurance. 
6. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services because plaintiff spent very 
few hours on the job site and did not give the construction 
project the attention that it required under the contract and 
that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect. 
-4-
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7. The Court concludes that defendants are not in 
breach of the contract in any way. 
8. With respect to plaintiff's Unjust Enrichment 
Claim, the Court has considered several alternative methods of 
calculating any award to plaintiff under such a theory. The 
Court concludes the most logical basis to be the percentage of 
defendants1 residence that was completed during the period plain-
tiff was on the job. 
9. The Court rejects plaintiff's proposal that it 
should receive 1/4 or $25,000, of the $100,000 consideration con-
templated under the contract because it spent three months on the 
job, or one quarter, of the one-year period for constructing the 
residence as contemplated under the contract. The Court finds 
that such a proposal is unreasonable and unsupported by the 
facts. 
10. The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to 
receive $15,500 from defendant in quantum meruit/unjust enrich-
ment, based on the contract between plaintiff and defendants, 
$10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for 
services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for 
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber. 
11. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendant for the sum of $1,800 which represents defendants' 
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costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' 
east side retaining wall. 
12. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendants in the amount of $2,000 which represents defendants' 
costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' 
west side concrete steps. 
13. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendants in the amount of $559, which represents defendants' 
costs for plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary Glu-Lam beams. 
14. The Court concludes plaintiff is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, 
from November 1, 1990, the date defendants terminated plaintiff's 
services, to April 17, 1992, the date this Court granted plain-
tiffs' Motion to Compel Filing of Findings of Fact, and 
post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after April 17, 1992. 
DATED this ^ day of O&t » , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER WILKINSON 
District Court Judge fo'c "'"'' \o' 
UJCE J. NELSON 






SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• • • • • • • • 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees 
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 10870 
* * * * * * * * 
This action came on for trial before the Court, the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, presiding, and the 
issues, having been duly tried to the Court, and the Court having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff recover from defendants in quantum 
meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff 
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and defendants, the amount of $11,141.00, with interest thereon 
at the legal rate provided by law in accordance with paragraph 4 
below, which represents $10,000 for services rendered in direct-
ing and supervising l/10th of the construction of defendants' 
residence, and $5,500 for plaintiff's services involving negotia-
tions for the purchase of lumber, adjusted by applying as an off-
set the following awards to defendants: 
a. The sum of $1,800 which represents defen-
dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of 
defendants' east side retaining wall; 
b. The sum of $2,000 which represents defen-
dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of 
defendants' west side concrete steps; and 
c. The sum of $559 which represents defendants' 
costs caused by plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary materials; 
2. That defendants are not entitled to attorneys' 
fees and costs attributable to defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; 
3. That plaintiff is awarded $542.40 as its costs of 
court itemized as follows : 
a. Filing fee, $75,00; 
b. Service of process fees, $32.25; 
c. Kurzet deposition; $311.15; 
-2-
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d. Bailey/Kent depositions, $99.00; and 
e. Expert witness fee, $25.00. 
4. That plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment inter-
est on $11,141.00 at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum for 
the period from November 1, 1990 to April 17, 1992, and 
post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after April 17, 1992; and 
5. That defendants counterclaims are hereby dis-
missed with prejudice. 
^ day of . 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRUCE J. NELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
/ • X**mxi**> 
HOMER WILKINSON 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge ^ C >v> 
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ADDENDUM C 
/ i U J / J D l l U U l Y I V, 
A G R E E M E N T 
This Agreement covers all of the understandings existing 
between BAILEY-ALLEN (Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for 
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of the EVERGREEN 
development at DEER VALLEY, PARK CITY, UTAH. 
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a cost plus fixed fee 
basis. Costs shall be billed monthly and payment shall be made 
within ten days of receipt of billing. The fee fixed for this 
contract is set at $100,000 for the residence as depicted in the 
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in directed additional work, if 
any. Any directed additional work in excess of an aggregate cost 
of $50,000 will result in additional fees based on 7% of the cost 
of such additional work. 
All billing incorporating costs involving subcontractors or 
suppliers will be supported by copies of invoices clearly showing 
that the services were performed and/or materials delivered at the 
job site and shall further carry the notation by Contractor that 
the billing is true and correct. 
In the event that Owner's absence from Park City would result 
in failing to pay Contractor in a timely manner as set forth above, 
Contractor may Fax the billing to Owner and Owner shall cause 
payment to by made by express mail or electronic transfer directly 
to Contractor's account, however, when such payment is made, Owner 
reserves the right to review and obtain adjustment if indicated 
pending the opportunity to review the records and work performed 
upon Owner's return. 
Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that this contract cannot 
be changed except and unless in writing, bearing the date and 
signatures of both parties. 
The residence shall be constructed in accordance with the 
drawings and no change will be made without the express written 
consent of Owner. All changes will be covered by a written Change 
Order in the form of EXHIBIT A attached hereto, describing the 
nature of the change, the resulting differential in costs and the 
impact on completion schedule if any and be dated and approved by 
both Owner and Contractor. 
The work is to be performed in accordance with a schedule 
prepared by Contractor and the structure completed by April 15, 
1991 and a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy shall have been 
obtained by that date. The only Item permissible to be outstanding 
on the TCO is landscaping. A schedule in the general form of 
Exhibit B, prepared by Contractor shall be the definitive document 
for assessing whether work is or is not progressing on schedule. 
The residence was designed through the cooperative effort of 
1 
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Mark Walker, the Architect and Owner. Any questions pertaining to 
the structure should be directed to Mark Walker or his associate, 
Stan Johnson. If the architect fails to respond and such continued 
failure will cause increased construction costs, Owner is to be 
notified at the earliest possible moment so that he has the 
opportunity to mitigate such costs. The Owner shall not be liable 
for increased costs occasioned by such delays in response or 
recovery from drawing or design errors where the Contractor failed 
to notify Owner before the increased costs were so incurred. 
The Owner will have review authority and right of refusal on 
subcontracts and material purchases. The Contractor will obtain 
competitive bids for services and materials in sufficient time to 
permit a review of a maximum of one week duration by Owner and if 
necessary, select an alternative supplier without impact on 
schedule or cost. Every effort will be made by the Contractor to 
locate, solicit and select suppliers sufficiently in advance of 
need to prevent the forced acceptance of an uneconomic bid because 
a delay would be as costly or more costly than the loss arising 
from the uneconomic bid. All bids will provide sufficient detail 
to permit an intelligent analysis of the value of such bid. Time 
and material bids will at minimum state the proposed hourly rates 
for each category of labor and the percentage of fees and all other 
costs to be passed on to Owner for labor and material. Both fixed 
price and T&M bids will adequately identify the materials to be 
provided as to quantity, type, grade, model and manufacturer as 
applicable. 
The Owner's review authority notwithstanding, the Contractor 
is fully responsible to Owner for the performance of 
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs occasioned by the failure of a 
subcontractor to perform shall not be assessable to Owner. 
The Contractor shall carry insurance specifically providing for 
saving Owner harmless from any action arising due to the injury of 
a worker even if an employ of a subcontractor or supplier who is 
not properly or adequately insured. Contractor shall, within 10 
days of the date of this agreement furnish a Certificate of 
Insurance prepared by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The 
Certificate shall specifically state the purpose and limits of the 
policy and these shall show that the work to be performed under 
this contract is covered. 
Owner specifically states and Contractor acknowledges that 
Owner and only Owner is empowered to direct the Contractor to incur 
cost unforeseen by the plans and specifications that are in excess 
of an aggregate of $1,000 (one thousand Dollars) for any given 
category. A category is defined as a class of event such as work 
performed in accordance with a plan error that must be corrected, 
or need to perform additional work as a result of inclement 
weather, or rework directed by the City Inspector and similarly 
reasonably unforseeable events. Accordingly, any costs arising 
from the performance of a directive from any person whomsoever 
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other than Owner which are in excess of the $1,000 aggregate per 
category limit, will not be reimbursable under this agreement. 
Therefore, in order for cost arising from any ordered changes or 
rework to be reimbursable to Contractor, such work must be 
described and authorized in writing. However, the Owner will not 
unreasonably withhold approval for any proposed additional work 
which may in the opinion of Architect, Contractor, Inspector, 
Engineer, members of Owner's family or others be deemed necessary 
or desirable. 
The Contractor warrants that the residence will be free of of 
defects in workmanship and materials and shall, at no expense to 
Owner, correct any such defect for a period of one year from the 
date of the Temporary Certificate of Occupancy. The Contractor's 
liability in this regard specifically extends to consequential 
damage as may occur as a direct result of such deficiency in 
workmanship, and material. The Contractor's warranty liability 
does not extend to work performed or materials provided by Owner or 
to any consequence arrising therefrom. 
Contractor takes note that Owner is concerned about the 
quality of workmanship and materials and that this concern stems 
from prior experience with a local contractor and ownership of 
several condominiums at the Pinnacle development. Owner will not 
make unreasonable demands, however, slovenly workmanship and/or 
substandard materials will neither be accepted or paid for by 
Owner. Owner considers that the fees he pays to Contractor are 
specifically for his expertise in selecting and supervising workers 
so as to avoid unacceptable and substandard workmanship and/or the 
use of substandard quality materials. 
Both Owner and Contractor stipulate that time is of the 
essence and both will make every effort to reach the other as 
expeditiously as possible. The Owner and Contractor can be 
contacted as set forth in Exhibit C. 
In the event Owner will not be at either of these locations, 
Owner will leave or fax a schedule indicating where he can be 
reached on any given day. 
In the event Contractor is not available, he shall leave word 
as to who is authorized to act for Contractor. 









C H A N G E O R D E R 
In connection with the construction of the Kurzet residence on Lot 
#4 Evergreen, Mountainland Builders is hereby authorized to perform 
the following specific work and to supply the materials and 
services as needed for such performance. 
WORK DESCRIPTION 
UNDERSTANDINGS 
The cost differential of the above described work shall be: 
The affect on schedule of the described work shall be: 
APPROVALS 
CONTRACTOR DATE OWNER DATE 
4 
QQQ012 
- — - ^ _ MONTH 
ACTIVITY ^ — ^ _ 
[XFCUTE AGRTOTNT 
[P\P IKAAt LHH.K 
AM> STEIL 
W W LONG LEED ITOB 
•J l l I t ' l l AJUSUiUULL 
Rl»T«VE SNd 
IHMALL ALL UTILITY MO 
OR* IN LI IC5 
I I W W W M I L K . WW* 
AMI ULEJWC 
I M A U FOWWTKJN 
INSUATIONAMJ DRAINS 
'GRAU AM) RKK DRIVE 




L Y I I K I W WALL 
AM) ROCK 
ROUGH P l l i e iNG 
WMM I IHINU AMJ 
paw aecmicAL 
ALL I d VU.IAO. 
WIRING 
HYlHfJWIC H A I COILS 
AMI CTPCRCTr FLOORS 
INSTALL ALL EXTERIOR 
POORS AM) WINDOWS 
M E R I T * INSULAIION 
AM) WALLS 
FINISH PLUGINC 
CAP NITS Aror WISH 
CARPI NTTff 
PAINT AM) PATER 
FINISH ELECTRICAL 
















J'JN JUL AUG SEP OCT 
— 
— 
NOV DEC JAN j 
A 
EXHIBIT B- -PAGE 5 - -PROJECT PLANNING DOCUMENT, (PPD) 
EXHIBIT C 
TO CONTACT CONTRACTOR 
Office: P.O. Box 11074 
Salt Lake City, UT 
84147 
Richard Allen Tel. 801-973-7888 
Michael Kent 
Park City Mobil 














PO Box 680670 
1250 Pinnacle Drive 
Park City, UT 68048 
Tel. 503-888-9269 
Fax 503-888-6055 
PO Box 5039 
Charleston Station 















Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (1992) 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
ADDENDUM D.2 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 (1992) 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date 
the judgment was entered in the trial court. 
ADDENDUM D J 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992) 
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment 
bond — Liability. 
(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond 
is liable to each person who performed labor or ser-
vice or supplied equipment or materials under the 
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or ser-
vice performed or the equipment or materials fur-
nished up to but not exceeding the contract price. 
(2) No action to recover on this liability may be 
commenced after the expiration of one year after the 
day on which the last of the labor or service was per-
formed or the equipment or material was supplied by 
the person. 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the 
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs in 
the action. 1989 
ADDENDUM D.4 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992) 
38-1-18. Attorneys* fees. 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to re-
cover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 1961 
